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2Abstract
This paper examines the joint role of market feedback and investment constraints on 
managerial behavior. Using a sample of UK fixed price initial public offerings, we show 
that underperformance of share returns at the IPO significantly affects managerial 
investment decisions in the period after the offering. Firms with better investment 
opportunities and proportionately lower fixed (higher intangible) assets are more sensitive 
to negative market feedback. Over the longer term, the more responsive firms perform 
significantly better than their non-responsive counterparts. The findings contribute to the 
debate on the informational advantage of managers over investors and present strong 
evidence that the market, on aggregate, can provide a superior assessment of a firm’s 
opportunities. Managers who are able to respond to negative market feedback can 
significantly improve their firm’s future prospects. 
31 Introduction
Many studies have focused on the importance of activist equity and debtholders and their 
influence on company decision making,1 however, very few studies have considered the impact 
of market sentiment on company decision making.2 Is a company’s management aware of market 
sentiment, and if so, how does this affect their long-term business decisions? The aim of this 
paper is to provide a comprehensive answer to this question, which is of interest not only to 
researchers in corporate finance but also to investors and policy makers. Specifically, we examine 
the impact of market feedback on a number of firm level business decisions extending earlier 
work which examines the extent to which market feedback affects capital expenditures (Van 
Bommel and Vermaelen (2003)). Further, we examine the extent to which investment constraints 
impact upon the ability of managers to respond to feedback, a pivotal factor which has been 
overlooked in previous work. As we will see, such constraints determine the extent to which 
managers are able to adjust their plans in response to market feedback, which in turn has 
significant consequences for companies’ long run performance.
The debate on the superiority of management information versus that of the market on aggregate 
has been led by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers and Majluf (1984) and Subrahmanyam and 
Titman (1999). Models of agency theory [Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf 
(1984)] are built on the premise that managers are more informed than outside investors. 
However, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argue that the market in aggregate may be better
informed (about a firm’s prospects) than management. As a result, stock prices provide
information that is useful to firm insiders. Similarly, Rock (1986) argues that in an IPO,
management (including their advisors) lack perfect information with regard to the true value of 
                                                
1
See for example Jensen (1986), Eckbo and Verma (1994), Kochhar and David (1996), Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002), and English, 
Smythe, and McNeil (2004).
2 Maksimovic and Pichler (1999), Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) and Van Bommel and Vermaelen (2003) are examples.
4their firm, and whilst they may know more than any individual investor, they know less than all 
investors combined.
Initial public offerings are, in many ways, an ideal event to study the effect of market feedback on 
long-term business decisions. The IPO is clearly defined with no market events to precede it. This 
permits a direct and clean analysis of the sensitivity of managerial decision making to signals of 
aggregate market expectations and sentiment. On the date of listing, investors have, for the very 
first time, an opportunity to express their view on the value and prospects of an issuing firm.  
Consequently, managers, for the first time, can compare their own accounting-based valuation (of 
the firm’s basket of projects) to that of the market and respond accordingly.
This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we extend earlier work3 to 
examine the impact of market feedback on a number of firm level business decisions. To fully 
understand the dynamics of managerial decision making and its sensitivity to factors such as 
market feedback, it is important to consider several dimensions of managerial behavior. In this 
regard, we examine the joint sensitivity and endogeneity of investment and financing decisions. 
Second, we are not aware of any prior papers which examine the impact of investment constraints 
on managers’ ability to react to market sentiment and the implications of this for firm 
performance over the longer term and our paper addresses this gap in the literature.  
Third, we develop comprehensive empirical proxies for market feedback and unexpected
investment and financing decisions. Importantly, we directly record deviations from planned 
expenditures using information from prospectuses rather than implying deviations using 
econometric models. Although there are benefits to the latter approach, directly calculating the 
                                                
3 We refer to the work by Van Bommel and Vermaelen (2003) cited above.
5difference in expenditure from official documents will result in a more accurate proxy for
managerial sensitivity to market feedback. We also examine an alternative proxy for market 
feedback. Our approach centers on deviations of the market price from the issue price and we 
calculate feedback over the first month of listing so as to avoid any possible confounding effects 
of investor over-reaction at the IPO [see Loughran and Ritter (1995)].
Finally, the paper considers the effect of market feedback in an environment, the United Kingdom,
outside of the United States. The UK is similar in many respects to that of the US with the 
exception that price support after share offerings is less endemic in the UK.4 As a consequence,
the results of our study are likely to be more robust than if they been undertaken on a sample of 
US IPOs, where any market feedback would be distorted by price support.
We find that firms with the most negative market feedback have significantly higher levels of 
scaled under-investment than other firms (there is no evidence of scaled over-investment for 
positive feedback firms).  Investment opportunities and operational flexibility determine the 
extent to which managers can modify their investment strategy as a result of market feedback.
Average under-investment among the most negative feedback firms is driven by firms with the 
greatest investment opportunities, where under-investment levels are over ten times more than 
firms with the most positive feedback. We find no evidence that under-investing firms increase 
their debt repayments or make higher dividend payments and suggest that funds raised for 
investment purposes are retained pending the modification of investment plans. Unsurprisingly, 
the poorest feedback firms which face the strongest investment constraints, do not reduce their 
planned investment and press ahead with their investment plans despite market opinion.
                                                
4 Only a very small number of IPOs in our sample stipulated that the underwriter may over-allot shares or engage in other activities 
which may stabilize or maintain market prices.
6Managerial reactions to market feedback have implications for long-run performance. Firms that 
respond to negative market feedback perform no worse than their positive feedback counterparts
over the longer term. Specifically, firms that revise their investment plans in response to negative 
market feedback have risk adjusted share returns which are significantly lower in the first 12
months after the IPO, but subsequently recover to be similar to comparable positive feedback 
firms up to 24 and 36 months later. Firms that do not respond to market feedback at the IPO have 
risk adjusted returns that are significantly lower than comparable positive feedback firms at 12, 
24 and 36 months post-IPO. 
A related study to the present paper is Van Bommel and Vermaelen (2003), who examine capital 
expenditure decisions following IPOs. However, our analysis is different in several key ways. 
Most significantly, we consider the impact of investment constraints on managerial reactions to 
market feedback, and the consequences of a failure to anticipate these constraints on long run 
performance. We also extend our analysis to consider the wider impact of under-investment on 
the business decisions of the firm, thereby providing a more complete picture of the consequences 
of market feedback.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section Two provides an overview of the institutional 
environment in the UK. The sample description follows in Section Three.  Section Four develops 
proxies for market feedback, unplanned capital expenditures and investment constraints. Section 
Five presents our empirical results and Section Six concludes the paper.
2 Institutional Background
In the UK, a pathfinder prospectus is issued about 6 weeks before admission of the firm to the 
market. Presentations to potential investors, which involve the issuing company’s advisors and 
7representatives, take place about 4 weeks prior to the issue date of the full prospectus.  Indications 
of interest are gathered at these presentations and together with market conditions, the issue price 
is determined.
All London Stock Exchange (LSE) listings must be sponsored by an LSE approved advisor and 
the sponsor will usually act as the lead underwriter. The two predominant methods of issuing 
shares are Offers for Sale and Placings. In an Offer for Sale, both institutional and private 
investors subscribe for an allocation of shares. A Placing involves the issue of shares to specific
institutional investors, who have been selected by the issuing firm’s sponsor or broker.5
Discriminatory pricing in an initial public offering is prohibited in the UK. When issues are 
oversubscribed, shares are allocated on a pro-rata basis. A constant proportion need not be 
applied across all applications when dealing with oversubscription since the LSE allows 
discrimination in the allocation of shares on the basis of the size of the application. However, the 
LSE does not usually allow discrimination in the allocation of shares on the basis of the identity 
of the applicant (Brennan and Franks (1997)). In all cases, the investment bank handling the issue
must publish the basis on which shares are allocated.
3 Sample Description
The sample consists of all initial public offerings of equity on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
and the Alternative Investment Market (AIM)6 over the period January 1991 to December 1998
for which prospectus and share price data are available. Introductions, investment trusts, and 
                                                
5
With reference to UK market terminology it should be noted that both ‘offers for sale’ and ‘placings’ are universally referred to as 
IPOs in the academic literature. Thus, for example, the samples of UK IPOs employed by Levis (1995), Rees (1997) and Espenlaub et 
al. (2000) include both offers for sale and placings. ‘Placings’ involve an initial listing of the firm’s shares on an exchange and can 
thus be differentiated from ‘private placements’ which are not IPOs.
6 We include 7 listings on the forerunner of the AIM market, the Unlisted Securities Market. This closed to new entrants on 
31.12.1994, and the AIM opened on 19.06.1995.
8privatisation IPOs are excluded from the sample because they are unlike conventional corporate 
offerings and would misrepresent the underlying results.
We focus on firms that declare the amount to be spent on investment at the initial public offering. 
There were 224 of such IPOs,7 of which 39, primarily from the financial sector, are omitted, 
owing to a lack of appropriate accounting data.8 This leaves a final sample of 185 initial public 
offerings. Table One presents statistics on the uses to which the funds raised at the IPO were 
employed.
Insert Table 1 about here
For the purposes of the analysis undertaken in Table One, investment has been divided into two 
categories, specific and general. If an issuing firm has given details of the investment to which 
funds will be put, this is classified as specific investment. Just over 27% of raised funds are 
applied to specific investment projects that are detailed in the IPO prospectus. General investment 
relates to the company’s stated intention to apply the funds to investment, but no further details 
have been given; 34% of funds are allocated in this way. 
Table One shows that the repayment of liabilities is the other predominant reason for which funds 
are raised at the IPO, with 25% of all monies devoted to this purpose. The remaining 14% of 
funds are applied to working capital, marketing, or placed on deposit.
                                                
7 There were a total of 652 domestic IPOs to the London Markets from 1991 through 1998 denominated in GBP, net of introductions, 
investment trusts and sales by the Secretary of State (privatisations). Prospectus and share price data is available for 502 of these IPO 
companies, of which 224 IPOs state an intention to apply proceeds raised at the IPO to investment. A chi squared test confirms that 
the sample of 502 IPOs for which data is available does not significantly differ in industrial composition from the 652 IPOs which 
constitute the population. The industrial sectors employed for the purpose of the chi-squared test are Resources, Industrials, Consumer 
Goods, Services, Utilities and Financials. Information Technology subsequently became a separate sector but these companies were 
included in Services at 1998.
8
4 of these 39 companies were not from the financial sector. Firms must survive for a minimum of 365 days to ensure that post-IPO 
spending is recorded.
9There is considerable variation in the uses to which funds are utilized over the sample period.  
Working capital is cited as a ‘use of funds’ in 18.86% of all IPOs in 1994 yet only 2.69% the 
following year.  However, whereas there is some volatility in the use of funds for general and 
specific investment, the aggregate figure is fairly consistent, ranging between 40% and 60%. 
4 Description of Proxies
The empirical proxies represent three major aspects of the analysis. One, we model the level of 
market feedback at the initial public offering. Two, we develop a representation of the degree of 
unplanned capital expenditure subsequent to the issue and three, we identify an appropriate proxy 
for investment constraints (opportunities).
4.1 Market feedback at the initial public offering
If the market feedback hypothesis is valid, managers assess information contained in post-IPO 
market returns to determine future investment policy - which may therefore be different to that 
contained in the IPO prospectus. Since the issue price is published alongside investment plans in 
the prospectus, it can be assumed that a fully subscribed IPO will raise sufficient cash to cover a 
firm’s published investment plans.
Our proxy for market feedback is the abnormal return over the first month of listing. We also 
report results where abnormal underpricing, the adjusted difference between the issue price and 
first day trading price, is employed as the market feedback proxy.9 When a company has a 
positive abnormal return this indicates that market feedback was positive, whereas negative 
abnormal returns indicate poor feedback.
                                                
9
Neither of these two measures affect the proceeds raised at the IPO. This is important since higher proceeds would have allowed 
more scope for capital investment.
10
The monthly abnormal return is given by the 20-day cumulative stock return less the 
contemporaneous cumulative return on the Financial Times Actuaries (FTSE) All Share index.10
Returns are measured from the issue price and cumulation occurs at the listing date of the IPO, 
and thereafter on a weekly basis.
The four week excess return is our preferred proxy for market feedback for two reasons. First, if 
managers are presumed to act on market feedback, it is important to establish that feedback is 
received by managers in the form we employ as a proxy. A comparison of an IPO firm’s
performance against the market index is likely to occur in all offerings. The determination of 
abnormal underpricing, on the other hand, requires the use of an econometric model, and whilst 
the factors we employ to determine abnormal underpricing are all reasonable (see below), there is 
a limited likelihood that the managers of each IPO will employ a similar model to determine the 
extent of market feedback.
The second reason for preferring a longer term proxy such as the four-week post-issue excess 
return, rather than IPO underpricing, is that managers are more likely to gauge feedback over the 
first month of listing rather than the first day of listing, given concerns of investor over-
exuberance at IPOs [Loughran and Ritter (1995)].
Our second feedback measure is abnormal IPO underpricing. Although there are a number of 
competing theories, 11 a consensus has not been reached on what determines the level of 
underpricing.  As a result, the issue is largely an empirical one. Considerable empirical evidence 
exists to suggest that IPO underpricing might be affected by the method of issue [Levis (1993)], 
                                                
10 Use of sector (FT Actuaries) indices in place of the All Share index did not materially affect reported abnormal returns.
11 For summaries, see Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1988), Tinic (1988), Shiller (1989), Saunders (1990), Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
(1996), Noland and Pavlik (1998), and Loughran and Ritter (2004).
11
the sponsor to the issue [Carter and Manaster (1990), Loughran and Ritter (2004)], the reporting 
accountant [Beatty (1989) and Hogan (1997)], the amount of equity sold/retained at the IPO [Jog 
and McConomy (2003), Downes and Heinkel (1982), Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson and Sefcik
(1992)], and market movements immediately prior to the issue [Rees and Byrne (1994), Loughran 
and Ritter (2002) and Hill and Wilson (2006)].
The method of issue (METHDUM), the sponsor to the issue (SPONSOR), the reporting 
accountant (ACCDUM), and movements on the sector index immediately prior to the setting of 
the issue price (MMNTM), are included as variables in a parsimonious model employed to 
determine expected IPO underpricing. This model is shown in Equation 1 below. 
Ri − Rm =  + β1Methdum + β2Sponsor + β3Accdum + β4Mmntm + ε (1)
where Ri−Rm is the natural logarithm of one plus the issue date return of the issuing firm less the 
issue date return on the FTSE All Share index; Methdum is a dummy variable that takes a value 
of 1 for issues via the placing method, and 0 otherwise; Sponsor is the natural logarithm of the 
market share of the sponsor;12 Accdum is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 where the 
reporting accountant is a Big 6 accountant, and 0 otherwise;13 and Mmntm is the return on the FT
Actuaries (FTA) sector index for a period of 2 weeks prior to the date of the prospectus. Test 
statistics are generated using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimates of the true 
standard errors since the null hypothesis of homoscedastic variances was rejected in preliminary 
testing.
                                                
12 The market share is given by the percentage of total IPO funds across the UK market handled by the sponsor during the sample 
period.
13 The Big 6 firms are KPMG, Coopers and Lybrand, Ernst and Young, Price Waterhouse/Price Waterhouse Coopers, Touche 
Ross/Deloitte Touche, and Arthur Andersen.
12
Insert Table 2 about here
From Table Two, it can be seen that placings lead to a significantly greater level of underpricing 
than offers for sale. This can be explained by the theories of Booth and Smith (1986) and Shiller 
(1989), where sponsors (underwriters) are keen to offer IPO shares to favored clients at a discount 
to earn reputation capital, which will lead to increased profits over the longer term. The 
reputations of the sponsor (as proxied by market share) and the reporting accountant, are, as 
expected, negatively related to the degree of underpricing.  Empirical support for the relationship 
between underpricing and sponsor reputation is provided by Carter and Manaster (1990) and 
Michaely and Shaw (1994), and between underpricing and high quality auditors by Beatty (1989)
and Hogan (1997).
Finally, pre-issue price momentum is shown to be significantly related to underpricing at the 
issue date.  Empirical support is provided by Hanley (1993), Rees and Byrne (1994), and 
Benveniste, Ljunqvist, Wilhelm and Yu (2001).  Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) suggest that issuers 
and their advisors fail to adequately gauge the pace of the market and consequently leave a 
significant shortfall between the issue price and market valuation.
4.2 Post-IPO unplanned capital expenditures
To determine the impact of market feedback on long term capital expenditures, we subtract the 
expenditure plans as declared at the IPO from the observed investment levels over a one-year 
period subsequent to the listing. This difference is then divided by the total value of the firm’s 
fixed assets on the issue date so as to standardise the expenditure levels across firms.14
                                                
14 Implicitly, we are assuming that the cash raised at the IPO would be invested within a year of the issue date. Table Three at the end 
of this section provides empirical support for this assumption.
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Investment plans are taken directly from the IPO prospectus whereas the actual level of
investment is taken from pre- and post-listing accounts. To estimate the post-IPO capital
expenditures, we add the net change in the book-value of fixed assets over the year to the
depreciation charge for the year.
Accounting information is only available on an annual basis, however many IPO firms prepare 
accounts for a smaller period to include in their prospectus, and we employ this information 
where available. If the first set of accounts filed after the IPO covers a post-IPO period of less 
than three months (ninety days), an investment period of one year is assumed to be commensurate 
with the year covered by the second set of post-listing accounts. In all other cases, a pro rata 
allocation of accounting data is undertaken.
Table Three presents the average planned and observed capital expenditures for the firms in our 
sample over the one-year period post-IPO. Of the £5,775,884 raised at the IPO for investment 
purposes, on average, £186,278 (3.2%) had not been spent one year after the IPO. Thus, 
investment plans set out in the prospectus appear to come to fruition over a reasonably short time 
period following the IPO.
Insert Table 3 about here
4.3 Investment Constraints
Investment opportunities and flexibility can influence the impact of market feedback on 
managerial behavior. A firm that faces numerous investment opportunities and has fewer fixed 
assets in place has more scope to revise initial investment plans. Conversely, firms that are 
investment-constrained will find it more difficult to modify pre-planned investment policies. 
Book to market value is a suitable proxy for investment constraints. However, given that 16% of 
14
the sample has a negative net worth, we employ the proxy of tangible fixed assets to market value, 
which, henceforth, we refer to as the book to market value.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Introduction
In Section 5.2 we undertake a preliminary analysis of the relationship between market feedback 
and capital expenditure. In Section 5.3 we incorporate the role of investment constraints in the 
market feedback - capital expenditure analysis. In Section 5.4 we investigate whether changes to 
investment plans as a consequence of market feedback have any impact on debt repayment and 
dividends. In Section 5.5 we compare the longer term performance of those firms which revised 
investment plans in response to market feedback with those which didn’t.  
As a first step, we present variations in the expected proportion of IPO funds to be applied to 
different uses (i.e. repay debt, investment, working capital, marketing, on deposit) conditional on 
market feedback (quintile portfolios) and investment constraints (high versus low book to market 
firms). For the purpose of this analysis, we employ our preferred measure of market feedback: the 
4 week return. Table Four compares the average percentage of total proceeds to be spent on each 
purpose for negative feedback firms (Quintile 1) and positive feedback firms (Quintiles 2 to 5)
across both low and high book to market values. 
Insert Table 4 about here
Low book to market firms expect to spend a significantly lower proportion of IPO funds on the 
repayment of liabilities than high book to market firms, but a significantly higher proportion on 
marketing. There is some evidence to suggest that Quintile 1 high book to market firms intend to 
15
utilize a greater proportion of funds on marketing than other high book to market firms. 
Otherwise there is no difference in the expected use of funds across market feedback or 
investment constraint samples.
5.2 Impact of market feedback on capital expenditures
Table Five presents firm capital expenditure conditional on market feedback for our two different 
feedback proxies. Panels A (market feedback as proxied by the 4 week excess return) and B 
(market feedback as proxied by abnormal underpricing) confirm that scaled abnormal capital 
expenditure increases with market feedback. The F statistic from a one-way ANOVA and the chi-
squared statistic from the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test confirm that scaled abnormal
capital expenditure is not equal across market feedback groups. The findings, especially those 
from Panel A, provide support for our core hypothesis of a positive relationship between market 
feedback and business investment activity.
Insert Table 5 about here
Firms with the most negative feedback at the IPO have significantly lower levels of scaled 
abnormal capital expenditure. Strikingly, Panel C of Table Five shows that firms with the most 
negative feedback (Quintile 1) have a level of scaled abnormal investment ten times lower than 
the rest of the sample (Quintiles 2 to 5). The significance of this finding is confirmed via both a t-
test and a Mann-Whitney U test.
When manager and market opinion rationally coincide, the expected number of firms under- or 
over-investing would be the same - a non-informative and unbiased prior. If managers believe 
16
market feedback, abnormally positive returns subsequent to an IPO may lead to overinvestment 
while negative returns may lead to underinvestment. We examine the number of firms that under-
invest across each feedback quintile and find that the percentage of firms under-investing across 
the first quintile is significantly higher, approximately 70%, than the average number of firms 
under-investing across other quintiles, which stands at around 50%.15 A chi-squared test confirms 
that this difference is significant at the 5% level. Thus, within Quintile 1, 30% of firms decide to
go ahead with what the market potentially deems to be unwise investment, whilst 70% of IPO 
firms do not undertake their planned level of investment.
This analysis can be compared to that of Van Bommel and Vermaelen (2003) and highlights
important differences between the US and UK.  In the US, the most positive feedback leads to 
significant overinvestment by IPO firms whereas our study provides a mirror-image result with
significant underinvestment for the most negative market feedback firms but no overinvestment 
for positive feedback. The assumption that positive feedback leads to greater investment in a 
firm’s basket of projects relies on those projects having scope for further investment. However 
what isn’t in doubt is that managers can choose to scale back investment on receipt of negative 
feedback.
5.3 The impact of investment constraints on managerial reactions to market feedback.
To investigate the impact of market feedback upon capital expenditures after controlling for 
investment constraints, we divide our sample into high book to market (i.e. firms with fewer 
investment opportunities and a higher proportion of fixed assets in place) and low book to market 
initial public offerings. In Panel A of Table Six, it can be seen that the characteristics (mean 
                                                
15 The proportion of firms under-investing across Quintiles 2 to 5 has a maximum of 51% (Q2 and Q4) and a minimum of 49% (Q3).
17
planned investment, size of the company, market feedback distribution) of firms do not differ 
significantly between groupings sorted on book to market ratio.
Insert Table 6 about here
Abnormal capital expenditure is then calculated separately for both high and low book to market 
firms within each feedback quintile.16 Results are presented in Panel B of Table Six.  The F
statistic from a one-way ANOVA and the chi-squared statistic from the non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test confirm that market feedback affects the level of under-investment for firms which 
face lesser investment constraints (low book to market values), but not for firms which face 
greater constraints (high book to market values). 
Low book to market firms with the poorest feedback at the IPO (Quintile 1) have a level of scaled 
abnormal capital expenditure over 10 times lower than that of low book to market firms with the 
most positive feedback (Quintile 5). Furthermore, mean scaled abnormal capital expenditure is 
significantly negative (representing underinvestment) for the poorest feedback firms (Quintiles 1 
and 2) with low book to market values. 
5.4 Redirection of Investment Funds
In Section 5.3 it was reported that poor market feedback and the existence of greater investment 
opportunities contribute to firm underinvestment after an initial public offering. This may suggest 
that under-investing firms retain a proportion of their IPO funds pending a revision of the original 
investment plans. However, proceeds not utilized for investment purposes might equally be 
                                                
16 The number of high and low market to book firms will vary across quintiles since we define a company as being either high or low 
book to market by reference to the full sample of companies rather than by reference to other companies within a particular quintile.
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redirected to restructure the financing of the firm. In this section we analyze the extent to which 
this is true, specifically whether the retained funds are used to pay off debt or pay out dividends. 
To obtain the “abnormal” amount of repaid debt, we subtract the amount of IPO proceeds 
scheduled for debt repayment in the IPO prospectus17 from the actual net repaid debt. Actual net 
repaid debt is given by the change in the amount of outstanding debt from the date of the IPO to 
the end of the period of the first post IPO accounts.  To this we add the amount of loans issued for 
cash and acquisitions less loans redeemed in the second accounting period following the IPO.18
As with abnormal capital expenditure this amount is scaled by the size of the IPO firm and, to be 
consistent with the scaling of capital expenditure, we employ the size of the tangible fixed assets 
at the date of the IPO for this purpose.
To determine whether firms redistribute under-invested funds to shareholders in the form of 
dividends, we examine dividend policy with respect to other firms in the same industrial sector. 
This is done by standardizing the average payout ratio of each firm over the two years post-IPO 
by the industrial sector payout ratio over the same period.19
We address three questions. First, does under-investment lead to the redirection of funds to debt 
and dividend payments? Second, do investment constrained firms that under-invest make larger 
repayments of debt and dividends? Third, does market feedback affect excess debt repayments or 
dividends after allowing for the impact of market feedback on investment? 
                                                
17 For this purpose we separate amounts committed to debt repayment from the amounts committed to the “repayment of liabilities” as 
shown in Table One.
18 The slightly longer period over which we examine debt repayment and dividend payments allows for a possible lag between the 
decision to review investment plans and the decision to redirect funds to debt or dividend payments.
19 The dividend payout ratios for each industrial sector across the sample are as follows: Resources 5.5%; Industrials 27.8%; 
Consumer Goods 14.5%, Services 22.3%; Utilities 0%; Information Technology 12.5%. Only one sample company belonged to the 
Utilities sector.  Only one of our sample firms undertook a share repurchase within 2 years of the IPO. This company announced a 
share repurchase 379 days post the IPO.
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We divide our sample into under- and over-investing firms and then sub-divide again into high 
and low book to market firms, and further into negative feedback (Q1) and positive feedback (Q2 
to Q5) firms. We report scaled abnormal debt repayments and relative dividend payments across 
each sub-group. On average, scaled abnormal debt repayments would be expected to be zero, and 
on average, dividend relatives would be expected to be one.  We test the mean and median across 
each sub-group against these expected values. 
Insert Table 7 about here
Table 7 suggests that positive feedback firms (Q2 to Q5) which under-invest make excess 
repayments of debt.  These are significantly non-zero and positive. However negative feedback 
(Q1) firms that under-invest do not make payments of debt which differ significantly from zero. 
The mean value of 3.20 for under-investing low book to market Q1 firms is caused by one firm 
making substantial scaled debt overpayments. Across the sub-samples that over-invested, on 
average, scaled debt overpayments did not differ significantly from zero. 
Turning to dividends, we find that under-investing low book to market negative feedback (Q1) 
firms had dividend relatives which were significantly below one, whereas over-investing high 
book to market positive feedback (Q2-5) firms had dividend relatives which were significantly 
greater than one. Across all other sub-groups the dividend relative wasn’t significantly different 
from one. 
In summary, we find no evidence that negative feedback firms with low book to market values 
redirected a larger amount of under-invested IPO proceeds to debt repayment. Nor do we find that 
these firms return any under-invested IPO proceeds to investors by paying a higher rate of 
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dividend than the sector norm. The results are therefore indicative of uninvested IPO proceeds 
being held on deposit pending the modification of existing investment plans.20
5.5 Long term analysis
In an efficient market, long-run performance expectations related to IPO quality should be 
reflected in a one-off adjustment to the price at the IPO, after which all firms should provide the 
appropriate risk adjusted return (see, for example, Brav and Gompers (1997) who make a similar 
argument in respect of the comparative performance of venture backed firms and non-venture 
backed firms). Where the market has provided sufficient negative feedback to prevent unwise 
investment subsequent to the IPO, we would expect to see no difference in the long run risk 
adjusted returns of the poorest feedback firms and the rest of the sample. 
In Section 5.3, we reported that it is those firms which face greater investment opportunities and 
flexibility that tend to under-invest (relative to their size), whereas investment constrained firms 
make no significant adjustment to their capital spending.  In this section we compare the longer 
term share price performance and longer term access to capital markets of positive (Q2 to Q5) 
and negative (Q1) feedback firms under differing investment constraints. Specifically we divide 
our sample into low and high book to market firms and compare their performance across 
different degrees of feedback.
We utilize a number of models to estimate the long run abnormal share price performance of IPO 
firms. Our first approach follows Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Stehle, Ehrhardt and 
                                                
20 We acknowledge that funds might also be redirected to current operating expenses, however the redirection of funds away from 
planned investment to operating expenses would be equally likely to apply to high book to market firms and since we find no evidence 
of underinvestment by these firms we consider this a less likely explanation.  Where funds are redirected to current operating expenses 
the firm may destroy value, since it must be assumed that the company had budgeted elsewhere for these expenses and thus expenses 
are larger than anticipated.
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Przyborowsky (2000) and compares the observed return on IPO firms to a control firm, matched
by market capitalization at the beginning of the first calendar year post-issue.21 The second
approach we consider is the market adjusted model [see Ritter (1991), Levis (1993), Brav and 
Gompers (1997), and Stehle et al. (2000)], where the return on the market (FTSE All Share 
index) is subtracted from the observed return on the IPO firm. Our third approach allows for 
sector wide influences. In this method, the return on the sector index is subtracted from the return 
on the IPO firm. Our fourth approach follows Espenlaub et al. (2000) and employs a multi-index 
model, as set out at Equation 2 below, to forecast expected returns.
E(Rit) =  + β1(Rmt − Rft) + β2(Rht − Rft) (2)
where, Rit is the return on share i for period t; Rft is the 90-day treasury bill return for period t; Rmt
is the return on the market portfolio (FTSE All Share index) for period t; and Rht is the return on 
the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies index for period t.22
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) on stock i at T months post-flotation is defined as the sum 
of the monthly abnormal returns to T months after the IPO date. Following Barber and Lyon 
(1997), if a company delists within 36 months of the IPO, it is assumed that an investor earns the 
benchmark (expected) return in subsequent periods.
                                                
21 IPO companies are smaller than many listed companies and we found that matching by both industrial sector and size forced us into 
selecting matched companies which deviated considerably in size from the IPO company, and we therefore prefer to match by size 
only. To mitigate the consequences of this we report industry adjusted returns and we undertake a chi squared test of the distribution 
across industrial sector of the two sub-groups, “Quintile 1” and “Quintiles 2 to 5” which confirms that the industrial composition of 
the two sub-samples does not significantly differ.   
22 Robustness checks are undertaken by also calculating long run abnormal returns with respect to the Hoare Govett Smaller 
Companies index and the CAPM model. The results are consistent with the main models and are not reported.
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Table Eight compares the long-run average cumulative abnormal returns of firms with negative 
feedback versus those with positive feedback for one, two, and three years respectively for low 
book to market firms (Panel A) and high book to market firms (Panel B).
Insert Table 8 about here
During the sample period, IPOs led to positive long run abnormal returns for most firms. This 
contrasts with the findings of Espenlaub et al (2000) and Levis (1993) who report negative long 
run share price performance of UK IPO firms. A possible explanation could be the different 
sample periods. The period from which the IPOs are drawn for this paper contains many IPOs 
from new sectors such as information technology, computer software and biotechnology, many of 
which would have been expected to outperform a benchmark made up of seasoned shares, which
contain few of these new technology companies. The earlier periods of 1985 to 1992 [Espenlaub 
et al. (2000)] and 1980 to 1990 [Levis (1993)] would contain very few of these new technology 
stocks.
Over a one-year period, all IPOs with negative feedback perform significantly worse than other 
IPOs. However, over a two and three year period the performance of negative feedback low book 
to market firms is in marked contrast to that of negative feedback high book to market firms. The 
performance of low book to market, negative feedback firms recovers such that returns over two 
and three years are not significantly different from those of positive feedback firms. We suggest 
that the investment opportunities enjoyed by these firms allow them to suitably modify their plans 
to take account of market feedback. 
By contrast, high book to market, negative feedback firms pressed ahead with their investment 
plans against market opinion and have extremely poor performance in comparison to positive 
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feedback firms, which extends over the three-year test period. These companies face investment 
constraints which would appear to have prevented them from fully responding to market feedback, 
leaving them exposed to investment in negative NPV projects.
In Table Nine, the results from a two-way analysis of cumulative capital raising in the three years 
post-IPO are presented. We compare capital raising across low and high book to market firms and 
across negative (Q1) and positive feedback firms (Q2 to Q5).  Capital is defined as the net (of 
repayments) total amount of equity, debt and preference share capital raised, as a percentage of 
IPO proceeds. Amounts for each year are cumulative. Firms which do not survive for the full year 
are omitted from the analysis for that year.
Insert Table 9 about here
By Year Three we see a significant difference in capital raising between high and low book to 
market firms with negative feedback.  There is also a similar difference between high book to 
market firms with positive and negative feedback. This mirrors the abject share return 
performance of investment-constrained, negative-feedback shares.  Having failed to take account 
of market feedback at the IPO, these companies fail to gain continued access to capital markets. 
6 Conclusions
Initial public offerings are periods of uncertainty for investors and managers alike. Share returns 
at the IPO contain information about the market’s assessment of the marginal return on the firm’s 
planned projects. Our results suggest that investment constraints have a significant effect on how 
managers employ market feedback to adjust pre-planned investment policies.
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Long run post-IPO performance is also affected by market feedback at the announcement. Over a 
one-year period companies with the most negative market feedback experience significantly
worse share price performance consistent with either unwise or underinvestment. However the 
persistence of poor performance is dependent on whether managers are able and willing to 
respond to negative market feedback. We find that negative feedback companies which revise 
their investment plans have a share price performance over 2 and 3 years which is not 
significantly different from positive feedback IPOs. Firms that fail to respond to negative market 
feedback continue to significantly under-perform other companies. 
These results have important implications for investors, managers and policy makers. Companies
facing limited opportunities to revise their investment plans subsequent to an offering should 
have their investment plans subjected to greater scrutiny prior to listing23 and in some cases have 
a more discounted offer price. As a result of inadequate pricing or screening, investors in these 
firms made considerable abnormal losses for up to three years post-listing.
In addition to presenting findings relevant to the UK IPO vetting process, this paper provides 
further empirical evidence on the relationship between stock prices and managers’ behavior. 
Although this remains an under-researched area, there is growing empirical evidence to support 
the theoretical contention that stock prices convey valuable information to managers. Market 
feedback does appear to influence managerial behavior even when detailed business plans have 
been developed and marketed to investors, as in an IPO.
                                                
23 Dittmann, Maug and Kemper (2004) analyse the relationship between valuation techniques employed by 
German venture capitalists and investment performance. Ritter (2003) argues that “very little academic 
research has focused on valuation issues” (page 429) and further analysis of the valuation techniques 
employed by UK IPO advisors, and the relationship between valuation techniques and longer term 
performance, is a possible avenue for future research.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics on the Use of IPO Proceeds
This table presents information on the application of proceeds for a sample of 185 UK initial public offerings over the period January 1991 to 
December 1998.  ‘Repayment of liabilities’ relates to the repayment of debt, preference shares, repurchase of equity capital, any deferred 
consideration due to equity shareholders and payments of any expenses or dividends outstanding.  ‘Specific investment projects’ refer to 
investment that was specified in the IPO prospectus. Funds are allocated to ‘General Investment’ when the issuing firm allocated funds to the 
purpose of ‘investment’ but details of the investment were not given in the IPO prospectus.  The final category of ‘On deposit/not specified’ 
includes those funds that were allocated to ‘general corporate purposes’ in the prospectus.
Totals 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
£’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000 £’000
IPO proceeds 1,733,969 12,975 79,816 172,243 248,791 299,935 398,102 339,831 182,277
N 185 2 6 14 27 16 52 48 20
% of which applied to1: % % % % % % % % %
Repayment of liabilities 24.73 34.48 28.13 37.29 20.55 34.34 15.37 27.29 16.20
Specific inv. projects 27.20 51.64 15.28 22.78 16.33 18.88 44.40 24.32 31.14
General investment 34.43 13.68 55.26 22.47 39.98 42.57 26.33 34.19 34.95
Working capital 9.94 0.00 1.33 13.79 18.86 2.69 10.89 10.18 8.25
Marketing 2.12 0.00 0.00 3.00 4.15 0.00 2.72 2.17 1.67
On deposit/not specified 1.59 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.32 1.33 0.30 1.85 7.79
Notes
1. The percentages in Table 1 represent the percentages spent on each purpose after aggregation and vary from the percentages presented in Table 
4, in which percentages spent on each purpose are calculated for each firm and then averaged.
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Table 2
Regression of Abnormal Underpricing against Issue Variables
This table presents the coefficients from an Ordinary Least Squares regression:
iiiiimi MMNTUMACCDUMSPONSORMETHDUMRR   4321
where (Ri – Rm) is the natural logarithm of one plus the issue date return of the issuing firm less
the issue date return on the FTSE All Share index; METHDUM is a dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 for issues via the placing method, and 0 otherwise; SPONSOR is the natural logarithm 
of the market share of the sponsor, which is given by the percentage of total IPO funds across the 
UK market handled by the sponsor during the sample period; ACCDUM is a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 where the reporting accountant is a Big 6 accountant, and 0 otherwise.  The Big 
6 firms are KPMG, Coopers and Lybrand, Ernst and Young, Price Waterhouse/Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, Touche Ross/Deloitte Touche, and Arthur Andersen; MMNTUM is the return on the 
FTA sector index for a period of 2 weeks prior to the date of the prospectus.  Test statistics are 
generated using White's (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent estimates of the true standard errors 
since the null hypothesis of homoscedastic variances was rejected in preliminary testing.
Coefficient t-stat. p-value
Constant 0.065 2.391 0.019
METHOD 0.099 3.851 0.000
SPONSOR -0.004 -2.305 0.003
ACCDUM -0.046 -2.150 0.022
MOMNTUM 0.793 3.003 0.032
N 185
Adj R2 10.80%
Breusch Pagan 2 11.951
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Table 3
A Comparison of Planned versus Actual Expenditure
This table presents details of the planned capital expenditures of firms as taken directly from the 
IPO prospectuses as well as the actual capital expenditure of the full year subsequent to the IPO.  
Excess capital expenditure is calculated as the difference between planned and actual capital 
expenditure.  Scaled excess expenditure is calculated by dividing the average excess capital 
expenditure measure by the average fixed assets at the IPO, as shown in this table.  Averages are 
based on 185 IPOs over the period January 1991 to December 1998.
Data Amount
Average planned investment £5,775,884
Average actual investment £5,589,606
Excess capital expenditure -£186,278
Average fixed assets at the IPO £6,636,261
Scaled excess capital expenditure using the above averages -0.028
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Table 4
Variations in the use of proceeds by market feedback and investment constraints
The sample is divided into lesser (greater) investment constraints by reference to their book to 
market values, with lower book to market values indicating lower investment constraints. A low 
(high) book to market value is one below (above) the sample median value. Firms are further 
subdivided into market feedback quintiles based on their IPO returns. Firms in Quintile 1 had 
negative IPO returns. Firms in Quintiles 2 to 5 had positive IPO returns. The percentage to be 
spent on each purpose as set out in the IPO prospectus is first calculated for each firm and this 
figure is averaged. These percentages therefore differ from those shown in Table 1 in which funds 
applied to each purpose are firstly aggregated across all firms and the percentages reflect these 







High Book to Market Firms
Q1 (Poorest feedback) 18 21.27% 54.02% 16.55% 5.65%# 2.51%#
Q2 to Q5 74 26.37% 60.17% 12.60% 0.84%# 0.02%#
Total High B/M 92 25.37%* 58.97% 13.38% 1.78%* 0.51%
Low Book to Market Firms
Q1 19 10.25% 66.85% 11.63% 11.27% 0.00%
Q2 to Q5 74 11.77% 60.83% 17.21% 8.09% 2.11%
Total Low B/M 93 11.46%* 62.06% 16.07% 8.74%* 1.68%
# Quintile 1 firms differ from Quintile 2 to 5 in the average proportions allocated to this 
purpose at a 5% level or above employing a non-parametric test. This result is not confirmed by a 
parametric test
* High book to market firms differ from low book to market firms in the average proportions 




Capital Expenditures Following Initial Public Offerings Across Market Feedback Quintiles
Scaled abnormal capital expenditures are calculated by subtracting the expenditure plans as 
declared at the IPO from the observed capital expenditures over a one-year period subsequent to 
an IPO listing. In order to standardise the expenditure levels, the difference is divided by the total 
value of the firm's fixed assets on the issue date. In Panel A, excess returns are calculated as the 
4-week, post-IPO compound return. In Panel B, excess returns are abnormal underpricing, 
calculated using the estimated model in Table 2.  The F statistic from a one-way ANOVA and the 
chi squared statistic from the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test confirm that scaled abnormal 
capital expenditure is not equal across market feedback groups. Panel C compares scaled 
abnormal capital expenditure for the poorest feedback firms with the rest of the sample. 
Panel A: Scaled capital expenditure averages for quintiles ordered by compound returns at 4 
weeks post-IPO.
Quintile N Week 4 excess 
return
Mean (Median) Scaled Abnormal 
Capital Expenditure
1 37 -10.07% -12.31 (-1.346)
2 37 3.37% -1.56 (-0.102)
3 37 10.96% -1.77 (0.034)
4 37 19.96% -1.54 (-0.049)
5 361 48.41% -0.87 (0.141)
Panel B: Scaled Capital Expenditure averages for quintiles ordered by abnormal underpricing.
Quintile N Abnormal 
Underpricing
Mean (Median) Scaled Abnormal 
Capital Expenditure
1 37 -13.06% -12.82 (-1.828)
2 37 -6.34% -1.19 (-0.125)
3 37 -2.31% -0.49 (0.052)
4 37 4.18% 0.88 (-0.049)
5 361 21.51% -4.11 (-0.205)
Panel C: Scaled capital expenditure averages for Quintile 1 versus the rest of the sample.








Quintile 1 37 -10.07% -12.31 -13.06% -12.82
Quintiles 2 to 5 1472 20.49% -1.34 4.15% -1.21
t stat -1.816* -1.889*
Mann Whit. z stat -2.813** -2.944**
** Significant at 1% and *5% level, employing a one tailed test.
Notes
1 One observation was omitted as an outlier, with scaled excess capital expenditure of 1173.57. 
The mean and standard deviation of scaled capital expenditure including this observation are 
30.87 and 193.50 for compound returns at Week 4 and 27.71 and 193.89 for abnormal 
underpricing.
2. The outlier referred to at Note 1 above is omitted.
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Table 6
Capital Expenditures and Investment Constraints
The sample is divided into high and low book to market firms by reference to the sample median 
value. 
As an introduction to Panel B, Panel A compares the characteristics of high and low book to 
market firms. 2 tests of the difference in proportions and t-tests of the difference in means 
confirm that there are no significant differences in the characteristics of high and low book to 
market firms (we employ a 5% significance level). 
In Panel B, scaled abnormal capital expenditure (CAPEX) is calculated as in Table 5. CAPEX is 
compared across market feedback quintiles for high and low book to market firms separately. The 
F statistic from a one-way ANOVA and the chi squared statistic from the non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis test confirm that CAPEX is not equal across market feedback groups for low 
book to market firms but this is not however the case for high book to market firms.






listings Market Feedback Distribution
£'000 £'000 % Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
High 
B/M 6,352 47,418 36% 20% 27% 21% 17% 15%
Low 
B/M 5,256 57,376 50% 21% 13% 20% 23% 24%

















1 18 0.34 -0.54 (0.03) 44 19 0.02 -23.45* (-5.90) 95
2 25 0.29 0.35 (0.18) 36 12 0.02 -4.29* (-2.28) 83
3 19 0.23 0.45 (0.18) 32 18 0.02 -4.12 (-0.31) 67
4 16 0.41 0.58 (0.21) 38 21 0.02 -3.16 (-0.55) 62
5 14 0.19 1.26 (0.33) 14 22 0.02 -2.22 (-1.76) 73
* Significantly different from zero at a 5% level of significance.
Notes
1. The Alternative Investment Market
2. Market feedback is defined as the 4 week excess return.
3.  One observation was omitted as an outlier, with scaled excess capital expenditure of 1173.57. 
This firm has a low market to book ratio. There are 92 IPO firms within each book to market sub-
sample (high/low). 
4. Scaled abnormal capital expenditure
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Table 7
The Impact of Underinvestment on Debt and Dividend Payments
Scaled abnormal debt repayments and dividend payout ratios are compared for under and over 
investing firms across both market feedback quintiles ((i) Q1 (ii) Q2 to Q5) and investment 
constraints ( (i) high book to market (ii) low book to market). 
A t-test is employed to test the null hypothesis that the population mean equals zero (debt 
repayments) or one (dividend relative). Sign and signed rank (Wilcoxon) tests are employed to 
test the null hypothesis that the population median is zero (debt repayment) or one (dividend 
relative). 




High Q1 8 0.54 (0.14) 1.65 (0.65)
Q2-5 23 0.36* (0.17**) 1.24 (1.17)
Low Q1 18 3.20 (0.18) 0.42* (0.00*)
Under-
invest
Q2-5 503 0.17 (0.19*) 0.88 (0.00)
Low Q1 1 0.16 (0.16) 1.68 (1.68)
Q2-5 23 -15.37 (0.00) 1.04 (0.80)
High Q1 10 -0.14 (-0.11) 0.75 (0.34)
Over-
invest
Q2-5 51 0.01 (0.01) 1.52** (1.31**)
** Significantly different from zero (one) at a 1% level of significance (* = 5% level of 
significance)
Notes
1. Scaled abnormal debt repayment
2. Average dividend over 1 and 2 years post the IPO relative to sector average.
3. One observation was omitted as an outlier with a scaled abnormal debt repayment of 3,552.
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Table 8
Investment Constraints and Long Run IPO Performance
This table presents long run share price performance by book to market. Low book to market poor 
feedback firms substantially revised their initial investment plans in accordance with market 
feedback, whereas high book to market firms did not. Panel A refers to low book to market firms 
and Panel B refers to high book to market firms. Four long-term return measures are utilised.  The 
first measure is the matched long-term return which compares the observed return on IPO firms to 
a control firm matched by market capitalisation at the beginning of the first calendar year post-
listing.  The second measure is the market adjusted long-term return where the return on the 
market (FTSE All Share index) is subtracted from the observed return on the IPO firm.  The third 
measure is the industry adjusted long-term return where the return on the industrial sector index is 
subtracted from the observed return on the IPO firm.  The fourth measure is the risk adjusted 
return and utilises the following model:
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where Rit is the return on company i, Rmt is the return on the FTSE All Share index, Rht is the 
return on the Hoare-Govett Smaller Companies index, and rft is the return on 90-day UK treasury 
bills.  Two test statistics are employed.  The t-test compares the difference in means across 
Quintile 1 and Rest of Sample and the z-statistic is from a Mann-Whitney U test that the locations 
of the two populations (‘Quintile 1’ and ‘Rest of Sample’) are equivalent.  Four companies were 
omitted from the long run study owing to a lack of data. 
Panel A: Low Book to Market IPOs
Quintile 1 Rest t stat. z stat
Number of Firms 19 72
Matched Returns
12 months -53.27% 11.80% -3.157** -3.164**
24 months -43.45% 19.39% -1.817 -1.797
36 months -0.27% 31.85% -0.755 -0.742
Market Adjusted Returns
12 months -30.53% -0.00% -1.936 -2.226*
24 months 1.23% 2.61% -0.052 -0.283
36 months 44.07% 22.31% 0.655 -0.723
Industry Adjusted Returns
12 months -41.89% -0.32% -2.589** -2.539**
24 months -26.26% -7.81% -0.675 -1.074
36 months 4.21% 2.89% 0.041 -0.225
Risk Adjusted Returns
12 months -26.47% 10.23% -2.389* -2.490**
24 months 1.19% 14.90% -0.548 -0.869
36 months 42.63% 23.83% 0.626 -0.859
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Panel B: High Book to Market IPOs
Quintile 1 Rest t stat. z stat
Number of Firms 18 72
Matched Returns
12 months -44.08% 16.49% -3.429** -3.298**
24 months -58.79% 22.49% -2.745** -2.774**
36 months -83.46% 23.00% -3.071** -3.077**
Market Adjusted Returns
12 months -43.92% 6.84% -3.481** -3.409**
24 months -67.32% 9.01% -3.496** -3.541**
36 months -70.40% 16.94% -3.293** -3.298**
Industry Adjusted Returns
12 months -34.89% 8.22% -2.932** -2.774**
24 months -51.35% 12.03% -2.782** -2.834**
36 months -54.55% 23.86% -2.852** -2.885**
Risk Adjusted Returns
12 months -32.74% 14.93% -3.634** -3.662**
24 months -49.42% 19.86% -3.490** -3.460**
36 months -53.82% 24.50% -3.046** -3.208**
** Significant at 1% and *5% level, employing a two tailed test.
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Table 9
Capital Raised Post the IPO
This table presents capital raising for three years post the IPO across low and high book to market 
firms and across negative (Q1) and positive feedback firms (Q2 to Q5). Capital is defined as the 
net (of repayments) total amount of equity, debt and preference share capital raised, as a 
percentage of IPO proceeds. Amounts for each year are cumulative. Firms which do not survive 
for the full year are omitted from the analysis for that year.
High B/M Low B/M t-stat z-stat
Year 1
Q1 Mean (Median) 0.40 (0.00) 0.58 (0.02) -0.454 -1.033




Q1 Mean (Median) 0.84 (0.21) 1.17 (0.77) -0.509 -1.505




Q1 Mean (Median) 0.65 (0.31) 3.24 (2.09) -3.370** -3.153**
Q2 to Q5 Mean (Median) 2.61 (1.15) 3.13 (1.07) -0.513 -0.443
t-stat -3.073** 0.066
z-stat -2.192* -1.758
** Significant at 1% and *5% level, employing a two tailed test.
